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Abstract 
All developed countries with few exceptions are facing problems related to prison 
overpopulation and non-custodial measures are marketed as the solution. The 
public’s involvement and endorsement of non-custodial measures is imperative and 
the success of these measures will depend upon the contribution of the private 
sector. The private for-profit and non-profit sectors’ involvement in this area is not 
new and unlikely to decrease; however, the public sector must be the one to 
identify the needs and not fall victim to the courting of the private for-profit sector, 
which prioritises profit and for who the offender in this context has become a 
commodity. The non-profit sector can counter the effects of risk management and 
its plethora of requirements, which are partly responsible for increasing technical 
violations and obliging probation to take on a more adversarial role. Up until our 
expectations of probation and offenders in the community become more attainable 
and reflexive, the non-profit sector can temper the depersonalised and automatic 
feedback. 
The legitimacy of non-custodial measures depends upon them being cost-effective, 
efficient, socially acceptable and reflexive. This paper focuses on three genres of 
non-custodial sentences, which are characteristic of retribution, coercive treatment 
and restorative justice. The use of these in the United States, Canada, England and 
Wales, Sweden and Spain is briefly overviewed as well as the contribution of the 
private sector. Non-custodial measures aren’t the panacea for all offending in all 
cultures but surely are a step in the right direction. 
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Resumen 
La mayoría de los países desarrollados se enfrentan a problemas relacionados con 
la sobrepoblación de las cárceles. Las medidas no privativas de libertad se 
presentan como una solución a este problema. Es necesario que la opinión pública 
participe y apruebe las medidas no privativas; el éxito de estas medidas dependerá 
también de la aportación del sector privado. La participación del sector privado, 
tanto de organizaciones con ánimo de lucro, como sin ánimo de lucro, en esta área 
no es nueva y es improbable que disminuya; sin embargo, el sector público debe 
identificar las necesidades sin dejarse influenciar por el sector privado con ánimo de 
lucro, interesado en obtener un beneficio económico, convirtiendo a los presos en 
una mercancía. Las organizaciones sin ánimo de lucro pueden contrarrestar los 
efectos de la gestión de riesgos y sus numerosos requisitos, que son en parte 
responsables del aumento de los incumplimientos técnicos y de que la libertad 
condicional asuma un papel contradictorio. Nuestras expectativas sobre la libertad 
condicional se han cumplido, y los delincuentes son más asequibles y reflexivos en 
la comunidad; las organizaciones sin ánimo de lucro pueden suavizar las reacciones 
despersonalizadas y automáticas.  
La legitimidad de las medidas no privativas de libertad depende de que sean 
rentables, eficientes, socialmente aceptables y reflexivas. Este artículo se centra en 
tres tipos de medidas no privativas de libertad, como son las características de las 
penas, el tratamiento coercitivo y la justicia retributiva. Se analiza brevemente el 
uso de estos tres tipos de medidas en Estados Unidos, Canadá, Inglaterra y Gales, 
Suecia y España, así como la aportación del sector privado. Las medidas no 
privativas de libertad no son la panacea para todos los delincuentes en todas las 
culturas, pero son sin duda un paso en la buena dirección. 
Palabras clave 
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1. Introduction 
On 14 December 1990, United Nations member states adopted resolution 45/110, 
the Standard Minimum Rules for Non-Custodial Measures (The Tokyo Rules). By 
doing so, members recognised the need to “promote the use of non-custodial 
measures, as well as minimum safeguards for persons subject to alternatives to 
imprisonment” (1.1 Resolution 45/110). These came into force when many 
developed countries were facing problems related to prison overpopulation, despite 
drops in non-violent crime rates. In the post ‘nothing works’ era rehabilitation and 
treatment in prisons had lost credibility and criminal justice systems were 
scrambling to retain their own. Under these rules, the judiciary disposes of various 
penalties and post-sentence dispositions, which aim to divert when possible 
offenders from prison thus reducing prison populations, preventing when possible 
the harmful effects of incarceration, and reducing costs by allowing employed 
offenders to remain employed and with their families. But contrary to earlier 
premonitions, non-custodial1 measures have had a net-widening effect by 
extending social control. 
The private sector has been involved in this area from the onset. Although it is 
often presumed that services restricting the freedom of individuals have always 
been within the public service remit -if not a State function, it certainly isn’t the 
case. For example, the Californian prison San Quentin was originally built and run 
in 1852 by a for-profit private entity. Similarly, transportation of convicts was a 
market created originally and sustained by merchant shippers (Feeley 2002, p. 
327). Transportation created a service in which convicts became a commodity. As 
in both of these cases, many of the requirements discussed in this paper were 
originally a private commercial trade that became a public service at the beginning 
of the 20thcentury, only to become once again privatised towards the end of the 
90s.2 In parallel, the private non-profit sector created and sustained certain 
services, which are now integral parts of our criminal justice systems and a State 
function such as probation. 
This paper presents the front-door strategies i.e. non-custodial punishments used 
to divert offenders from incarceration in the United States, Canada, England and 
Wales, Sweden and Spain, and the private sectors involvement in their delivery and 
provision. The private sector can contribute towards rendering non-custodial 
sentences more effective, facilitate offenders’ social integration and increase victim 
satisfaction. Collectively, effectiveness, insertion and satisfaction are what may 
bring about a change of tide and what may be needed to restore the credibility and 
legitimacy of non-custodial measures. Nonetheless, the systematic management 
valued by the for-profit sector, which has been imported by criminal justice systems 
to demonstrate efficiency such as key performance indicators, have stripped 
criminal justice and in particular probation of its discretionary and reflexive powers 
thus undermining ground gained by community involvement. Further, when we 
discuss cost-effectiveness in this remit, we must be careful to distinguish between 
short-term indicators valued by the for-profit sector and long-term change, such as 
when calculating relapses and desistance. Effectiveness, when used in the criminal 
justice system should not be associated with financial capital gain but social capital, 
which is perhaps an unfathomable concept for the private for-profit sector. Socially 
responsible policies ultimately may cost the taxpayer less in the long-term but 
more at the onset. If not, we are bound to rehabilitation failures based on 
convenience (Rothman 1980). 
                                                 
1 In concordance with Tonry (1995) terms such as non-custodial punishments and alternative sentences 
in lieu of intermediate sentences confounds the public into thinking that these are but a ‘slap on the 
wrist’ and not punitive. Nevertheless, non-custodial sentences and punishments are used in this paper 
so as to minimise cross-jurisdictional confusion. 
2 There are numerous earlier examples in the United States such as detention centres for illegal 
immigrants and prisons. Although in this regard, the U.S. was an exception, these did set the 
precedence for later privatization. 
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Finally, comparative studies in the area of criminal justice are plagued with 
“technical, conceptual, and linguistic problems posed by the unreliability of 
statistics, lack of appropriate data, meaning of foreign terms, etc., complications of 
understanding the differences in other languages, practices, and world views which 
make it difficult to know whether we are comparing like with the like” (Nelken 
2007, pp. 147-148). For instance, in certain countries probation is an order in itself 
and not a surrogate for a custodial sentence. Similar conclusions were drawn by 
van Kalmthout and Tak (1988, p. 15) in their study on community services. This led 
them to warn researchers against the irresponsible transposition of “the 
experiences of one country on another.” But, they recognised the value of 
comparative analysis for identifying broader lessons from the operation of sanctions 
in different jurisdictions (van Kalmthout and Tak 1988, p. 16). It is with this in 
mind that conclusions are drawn. The term probation is used in this paper to refer 
to all supervisory services delivered in the community; however, the country itself 
may not use the term when referring to its service. 
2. Non-custodial measures 
The Tokyo Rules enumerated twelve possible means through which sentencing 
authorities could dispose of cases. Greater attention is paid to the most commonly 
used requirements and to the most promising but underused provisions. The first 
section focuses on the blatantly retributive strategies. The involvement of the for-
profit sector is most evident in this area. This is followed by the second section, 
which presents coercive rehabilitation programmes. In contrast, the non-profit 
sector’s specialised providers are now the main contributors in this area and are 
heavily buttressed by volunteer associations. Finally, the most innovative but 
underused non-custodial measures are presented. This section presents 
requirements directed at the restitution and restoration for harm caused. Once 
again, the non-profit and voluntary sectors contribution as promoters and 
facilitators was and remains imperative. Each section also discusses how the private 
sectors’ contributions can facilitate or prevent non-custodial measures from being 
perceived by the public as viable and legitimate alternatives to custodial sentences. 
3. Retribution 
During the post-enlightenment period, prisons were championed as more 
humanitarian than corporal punishment. Similarly, probation and latterly electronic 
monitoring (EM) have been promoted as cheaper alternatives and to have fewer 
negative side effects than incarceration. Many studies have now demonstrated that 
probation hasn’t reduced prison overcrowding or reduced reoffending (Pertersilia, 
Turner and Petersen 1986). Nevertheless, more restrictive sentences and longer 
prison sentences haven’t succeeded in decreasing violent offending (Tonry 1997; 
McIvor 2010). There therefore remains substantial scope to examine alternatives 
and improvements, as well as to evaluate contributions made by the private sector. 
3.1. Probation 
Probation is the front-door diversion most commonly used by the judiciaries in the 
countries discussed. Probation has evolved or involved considerably over the last 
forty years. It was first used over two hundred years ago and was created and 
administered by lay members of society e.g. Matthew Davenport Hill and John 
Augustus. Originally, detainees were placed under the guardianship of a lay person 
who vouched that the person in question would be law-abiding and attend court 
appearances (Bonta et al. 2008). Once becoming a state-administered service, 
persons were also expected to attend appointments with a court designated person. 
Nowadays, probation officers deliver treatment to offenders, write pre-sentence 
reports, coordinate their work with external providers as case managers as well as 
meet with offenders. Their change in remit has led them to contract ancillary 
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service providers. Nonetheless, with the exception of the United States (U.S.) 
probation has remained a public service (Schloss and Alarid 2007). 
As a service it has faced a legitimacy crisis since the 1970s. Tonry (1995, p. 5) 
believes that in the case of the U.S. this was the outcome of Conservative 
campaigning and the public’s fear of folk devils, a perception that he summarises as 
“prison counts and only prison.” This coincided with the publication of Martinson’s 
(1974) infamous article What works?, which discredited treatment in prison settings 
thus delivering another blow to the credibility of the criminal justice system as a 
whole (Sechrest, White and Brown 1979). Intensive supervision and the 
popularisation of risk assessments emerged in this context (Petersilia and Turner 
1990). 
3.1.1. United States 
On 31 December 2009, there were 4,203,967 adults on probation in the U.S. (Glaze 
and Boncar 2010, p. 28). Although the number of probation entries minimally 
decreased in 2009, the number of exits increased substantially (Glaze and Boncar 
2010, p. 28). The drop in entries was due to legislation enacted and court-ordered 
mandates in certain states such as Washington and California, which forced them to 
reduce their community supervision population and direct their resources at high-
risk offenders. Undoubtedly, probation has taken on a more adversarial role. 
Certain states now train officers to use firearms and pre-sentence reports play a 
more important role and guide sentence calculations (Alarid and Del Carmen 2010, 
p. 148). The social workers of the 1970s are now taking on roles very similar to 
those held by law enforcement agents.3 
Florida was the first state to privatise probation in 1975. The Salvation Army 
Misdemeanour, a division of the non-profit Christian Mission the Salvation Army, 
was contracted by the state to supervise misdemeanour probationers (Lindquist 
1980). By 2007, roughly 10 states were using private agencies to deliver probation 
services (Schloss and Alarid 2007, p. 233). In most states that have privatised the 
service, the majority use a private provider to supervise low-risk offenders i.e. 
misdemeanour offenders but there lacks uniformity in practice. Schloss and Alarid 
(2007) originally intended to compare state statutes and private probation 
guidelines but concluded that it would be impossible because the detail in the 
statutes varied considerably. This led them to recommend that requirements for 
private probation be standardised. 
As aforementioned, in many states probation is now expected to concentrate on 
high-risk offenders. Intensive supervision probation (ISP) is directed at this 
category of offenders. In theory, it is a form of supervision that should be imposed 
in cases involving offenders who in its absence are likely to reoffend (Petersilia and 
Turner 1990; Caputo 2004; Tonry 1997). When launched, it was promoted by 
advocates to be a viable alternative to prison that was more than “just a slap on 
the wrist” (Petersilia, et al. 1985, p. 65). Offenders on ISP can be expected to 
attend frequent appointments with their designated officer, remain employed, 
abstain from drug and/or alcohol use, and submit to random testing, pay 
outstanding debts and remain at a set address. Although many of these 
requirements still remain within the remit of probation, the introduction of and 
growing dependency on electronic monitoring (EM) and the bureaucratisation of 
their work has led the service to be criticised for abandoning its rehabilitative role 
and for becoming a managerial body(Oldfield and Grimshaw 2010). 
ISP is a penalty that exists only in the U.S. Nonetheless, in 2008 the Home Office 
announced that it would pilot over two years the Intensive Alternative to Custody, a 
                                                 
3 In the case of England and Wales, professional training for probation officers no longer included social 
work training (Annie, Edison and Knight 2008). 
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new custody order. As in the case of the U.S., it involved consortia of private profit 
and non-profit sector. 
3.1.2. England and Wales 
Probation service’s caseload has gradually increased4 as a result of the revival of 
the suspended sentence order (SSO) and the agglomeration and restructuring of 
the community order (CO) under the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) of 2003. The CO 
and SSO are virtually indistinguishable; however, unlike the CO, the SSO is a 
suspended sentence and if breached may result in incarceration (Mair and Mills 
2009; Oldfield and Grimshaw 2010). The CJA introduced these new sentencing 
options for Magistrate and Crown Courts claiming that they would allow for both the 
judiciary and probation to better customise orders so as to reflect the offence, 
offending behaviour and needs of the offenders. 
As in the case of the Tokyo Rules, COs and SSOs can include up to 12 different 
requirements. In the fourth quarter of 2009, 37% of SSOs included one 
requirement and 42% had two; whereas, 51% of COs carried one requirement and 
only 35% two (Ministry of Justice 2010, p. 3). Although the number of 
requirements attached to orders remained relatively stable between 2005 and 
2009, the type of requirement disposed of changed slightly. Supervision remains 
the most common requirement; however, courts are increasingly likely to include 
unpaid work as an additional or sole requirement (Mair and Mills 2009, p. 11). 
Although the number of offenders beginning a CO or SSO increased in 2009 -as has 
been the case since the CJA came into force on 4 April 2005, the number under 
supervision at the end of the year decreased (Solomon and Silvestri 2008, pp. 14-
15; Oldfield and Grimshaw 2010). It is suspected that some offenders who would 
have received a longer CO in the past are now being given a SSO –one example of 
net-widening (Solomon and Silverstri 2008).5 Regardless, both are supervised by 
the National Offender Management Service (NOMS), which now unites the 
probation and prison services and supervises all offenders serving non-custodial 
sentences as well as those subject to an Intensive Alternative to Custody Order, 
and prisoners released on license. The only exception is the stand-alone curfew that 
is monitored by electronic tag or an attendance centre requirement. The 
privatisation of services once provided by probation is presently being debated. 
Most of the requirements are now delivered by the private sector (Meek, Gojkovic 
and Mills, 2010); however, probation is still responsible for reporting progress, 
completions and breaches to the sentencing court. 
As mentioned, supervision remains the most common requirement attached to an 
order. The for-profit sector’s involvement is increasingly evident in this area. 
Although probation has and remains a public service heavily buttressed by the 
voluntary sector6, the for-profit sector is gaining ground. Following the enactment 
of the Offender Management Act of 2007, local probation was replaced by Probation 
Trusts. At the time, Jack Straw, then Minister of Justice, claimed Trusts would have 
more scope to develop policy at a local level but would compete to retain 
contestability over services with voluntary and private organisations therefore 
obliging a public service to adopt managerial methods in order to retain its remit. 
Services would be tendered using the ‘competitive dialogue procedure’. Frequent 
                                                 
4 Probation caseload increased by 27% between 2002 and 2008. 26% of these were court orders and 
28% were related to pre and post-release work (Oldfield and Grimshaw 2010, p.13).  
5 In 2009, 3% (45,100) of offenders were given an SSO, an increase of 10% from 2008 and 35% from 
2005. SSOs allow a custodial sentence of less than 12 months to be suspended for a period of between 
six months and two years providing the offender completes certain requirements in the community. 
Comparatively, 14% (195,800) were given a CO – a rise of 3% from 2008 and 29% more than in 1999 
(Ministry of Justice 2010). 
6 The Society of Voluntary Associations (SOVA) was created in 1975 by a group of volunteers working in 
the London area with probation. It offers support, training and promotes best practices to volunteers 
working with offenders (van Kalmthout and Durnescu 2008). 
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flyers, Serco, Kalyx and com:pact –a joint venture between Mitie and A4E were 
shortlisted (Ministry of Justice 2011a). 
As aforementioned, the closest equivalent in England and Wales to the ISP is 
Intensive Alternative to Custody Order (IACO). The IACO was first piloted in 2008 
in seven probation areas. The Greater Manchester Probation Trust contracted the 
services of Work Solutions, Partners of Prisons and Group4Securicor to deliver 
related ancillary services. Work Solutions is part of the Economic Solutions Group, a 
non-profit organisation with an annual turnover of £53m.Group4Securicor is the 
leading security company in England and Wales. The pilot has therefore involved a 
heterogeneous mix of service providers. Consortia between organisations and/or 
corporations allow for smaller non-profit organisations that perhaps lack the 
financial backing, business and bureaucratic acumen of larger for-profit 
corporations to bid for large scale tenders; however, concerns exist regarding 
whether non-profit organisations and for-profit corporations are ideal companions in 
particular, the unequal distribution of profits to cover costs between larger and 
smaller agencies and problems relating to integrity (Meek, Gojkovic and Mills, 2010, 
p. 13). It is questionable as to whether local non-profit organisations that are rich 
in local knowledge and perhaps legitimacy will be able to hold their own when 
strategies are negotiated with larger corporations. Nonetheless, this can arise 
regardless of whether the larger entity is for-profit or not. 
3.1.3. Canada 
In 2010, probation was the most common sentence handed down by Crown Courts. 
In 2008/2009, a probation sentence was handed down in 45% of all convictions 
whereas a custodial sentence was imposed in 34%. Of these, only 4% received a 
conditional sentence and only 3% included a restitution requirement (Thomas 
2010, pp. 5, 8). Thomas (2010) found proportions to have fluctuated minimally 
over recent years. 
In Canada, probation is a judicial function and a provincial responsibility. Although 
sentences are based on a common Criminal Code, they can be administered 
differently dependent upon the jurisdiction (Calverley and Beattie 2004). In 2004, 
probation, unpaid work and conditional sentences were available in all jurisdictions; 
however, not all non-custodial requirements were. With the introduction of 
conditional sentences on 3 September 1996, sentenced custody admissions 
decreased (Hendrick, Martin and Greenberg 2003).7 In parallel, probation’s 
caseload increased. The conditional sentence is the closest equivalent to the ISP 
and IACO. When introduced, the legislature clearly stated that the sentence was 
created with diversion in mind and in response to prison overpopulation. Further it 
should be more onerous than probation and those serving a conditional sentence 
should be subjected to more intensive supervision. The legitimacy of the sentence 
and its overseers would appear to be lacking given that only 4% of those convicted 
received the sentence in 2008/2009. 
Non-profit organisations have been contracted by certain provinces to provide 
ancillary offending related programmes as well as to monitor offenders on EM and 
on conditional release; however, probation officers are expected to draft reports, 
open and close cases and lay administrative charges for breaches. The Howard 
League and the Salvation Army are the only two private organisations to have been 
awarded contracts to supervise offenders on probation; however, the current Prime 
Minister, Stephen Harper, has expressed a desire to expand privatisation in the 
area of criminal justice but has yet to make any direct references to probation. 
                                                 
7 Although originally brought in as an amendment to the Criminal Code of Canada, it was amended 
shortly following the enactment of Bill C-51 on 31 July 1999. On 6 August 2009, the Conservative 
government presented a bill which further restricted the use of conditional sentences by reducing the list 
of offences for which this sentence can be used (MacKay 2009). Obviously, this may come to annul gains 
made though the introduction of the conditional sentence, which had led to drop in admissions.  
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3.1.4. Sweden 
Swedish probation is somewhat of a ‘framework penalty’ and has numerous 
different combinations (Lappi-Seppälä 2007). Probation can be combined with a 
fine, a short prison sentence, unpaid work or a treatment contract. In 2009, 7 881 
offenders were imposed a probation sentence. Of these, 1 390 included contract 
treatment and 1 466 community service (Swedish Prison and Probation 
Service/Kriminalvården 2010). There are 30 independent supervision boards. These 
are made up of an experienced judge and individuals drawn from members of 
parliament, charitable organisations, unions etc., and are appointed by the 
municipalities. Their main task is to manage violations of conditions and can go so 
far as to recommend that probation be revoked. Over half of offenders on probation 
are supervised by a probation officer. Probation officers are volunteers who support 
and motivate offenders to comply and meet the requirements for whom “...a 
connection to the client’s environment and interests are required” (Ibid., 2010, p. 
13). The remainder are overseen by non-custodial care officers. On 31 December 
2009, 1 009 senior and qualified probation staff, and 146 unqualified probation staff 
were employed by the Swedish Prison and Probation Service.8 Of these, 960 were 
probation officers (SPACE II 2011, P.60). 
Sweden introduced electronic monitoring in 1994 being one of the first European 
countries to use it for front door, back door i.e. post-custodial and prison schemes 
(Wennerberg and Pinto 2009). Intensive supervision is also available for those 
sentenced to up to 6 months of custody, a term that can be served at their home 
whilst on EM. Only offenders working or attending treatment or education are 
eligible (Swedish Prison and Probation Service/Kriminalvården 2010, p. 13). 
3.1.5. Spain 
Probation does not exist in Spain; however, there exists three types of non-
custodial sentences: unpaid work, suspended sentences and security measures. 
Non-custodial sentences are technically referred to as alternative measure 
sentences and fall under the remit of alternative sentence supervision coordinators. 
The Vice-Directorate of Territorial Coordination (VDTC) coordinates ancillary 
services; oversees institutional collaboration projects; manages and supervises 
community sentences; oversees the execution of suspended sentences and 
supervises those on EM. Finally, it drafts reports for the various judicial authorities. 
In short, it is a closest Spanish equivalent to probation. On 31 December 1999, 
Spain reported having 650 ‘qualified’ staff i.e. chiefs of units, social workers and 
temporary psychologists, and 151 ‘unqualified’ staff i.e. generic workers employed 
to oversee all community sentences (SPACE II 2011, p. 60). On the same date, 
185,476 persons were serving a community sentence of which, 161,008 were 
completing community service. Of these, 122,366 were convicted for a road safety 
offence (Ministerio del Interior online). Far fewer, 20,718 had received a suspended 
sentence. 
3.1.6. Basque Autonomous Community 
The Spanish Federal Local and Provincial Administration (SFLPA) is responsible for 
coordinating the local administration of alternative measures (van Kalmthout and 
Durnescu 2008). The Reinsertion Assistance Service (Servicio de Asistencia a la 
Reinserción (SAER)) is the public agency within the Justice Department in the 
Basque Autonomous Community (BAC) responsible for writing reports on convicts 
serving non-custodial sentences and overseeing their compliance with sentencing 
requirements. The reports are based on the information received from the ancillary 
service private treatment providers. The SAER is also responsible for designing 
offenders’ individual plans for social reinsertion (SAER Memoria 2008). 
                                                 
8 The total of qualified and unqualified staff represents 12.5 staff per 100,000 population.  
Alison Hogg  The Privatisation of Non-Custodial Measures… 
 
 
Oñati Socio-Legal Series, v. 2, n. 4 (2012) 
ISSN: 2079-5971 153 
Up until the enactment of Royal Decree 515/2005 of 6 May9 on Community 
Services, tribunals and technical teams in the BAC had worked with familiar NGOs, 
non-profit organisations and foundations to provide the majority of offending 
related programmes in the community for those serving non-custodial sentences. 
The BAC has latterly opted to enact covenants with private agencies to oversee the 
completion of sentence requirements and now intends to formalise these ties so as 
to offer stability and ensure availability (Roberto Moreno. Interviewed by author, 2 
June 2011). EM is managed regionally, which will undoubtedly diversify the BAC’s 
portfolio; however, contracts are bid and administered at a state level. 
The EM market has rapidly expanded and transformed probation’s work. It is not a 
new technology per se but has slowly but surely become increasingly popular and 
the judiciary in all of the jurisdictions have expressed when interviewed or via their 
sentencing practices that they now consider it a legitimate strategy. EM’s popularity 
is growing among politicians in Europe – presumably due to its high profile as a 
means to protect the public. 
3.2. Electronic monitoring 
At present, there exists partnerships between public, private for-profit and non-
profit organisations, and voluntary associations, which is certainly not a new 
phenomenon and in certain cases are indispensable; however, the private for-profit 
sector’s involvement in the production, development, provision, and servicing in the 
EM market is mindboggling and much can be learnt from this experience. 
Electronic monitoring has evolved considerably. Most now include global positioning 
systems (GPS) and some states in the U.S. and Swedish regions now use devices 
that can also provide voice recognition, remote alcohol and/or drug detection, 
biometric analysis and kiosk reporting. The majority of these tasks were originally 
carried out by a person working for probation. Kiosk reporting in particular has 
considerably lightened their workload and in theory should allow for probation 
officers in the U.S. to focus on high-risk offenders (DeMichele and Payne 2005). 
The offender is recognised by their thumb print and can report their progress and 
provide information without having to report in person to their probation officer. 
The EM device was created in the U.S. As of the early nineties it became an integral 
part of their criminal justice system and is now used to supervise the compliance of 
individuals on bail, probation, parole, house arrest, and exclusion and restriction 
orders (DeMichele and Payne 2005, p. 19; Gowan 2000). Drake (2009) estimated 
that close to 44,000 GPS units were in use in 2009, which does not include those 
that solely rely on a radio frequency. Over half of which were in Texas, Florida and 
California. 
Similarly, England and Wales was the first European jurisdiction to pilot EM in 1989 
and to officially recognise it as a formal surveillance instrument under the Criminal 
Justice Act 1991. Although direct supervision by probation is on the decline, indirect 
EM monitoring is on the rise. EM is now used at various stages in criminal cases: as 
a condition on bail, as a sentence of the court (curfew orders), and as a condition of 
early release from prison under the Home Detention Curfew scheme. In 1998, 
contracts were awarded to three companies to supply and install the equipment, 
monitor offenders and to notify relevant authorities of violations (National Audit 
Office 2006). 
In Sweden, EM was first made available on a national scale in 1994 and is now a 
standard tool under the Swedish Penal Code (Law on Intensive Supervision by 
means of Electronic Monitoring 1994:451). It is not the sentencing court that 
                                                 
9 This law was reformed through the enactment of Royal Decree 1849/2009 of 4 December. In the law’s 
preamble, the legislature argued that the law needed to be reformed because it had not been fully 
effective due to a lack of opportunities for offenders. Although, the Autonomous Communities were best 
equipped to provide local projects for unpaid work, they had not been meeting this remit. 
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decides on the use of EM but the regional correctional authorities. Offenders who 
receive a custodial sentence of less than six months are eligible. In 2008, 9% of 
offenders on EM had their sentence revoked, the majority of which were as a result 
of a relapse into drug or alcohol use (Wennerberg and Pinto 2009, p. 12; Lappi-
Seppälä 2007, p. 48). Decisions to revoke orders are taken by a Judicial Board. In 
2009, 26% of offenders on EM were reconvicted; whereas, 38% of a comparable 
group not on EM were (Marklund and Holmberg 2009). Unlike Spain, EM is not to 
be used as a form of house arrest. A study completed by BRÅ in 1999 reported that 
supervision at the workplace was dissatisfactory as was the reporting of the contact 
person. The now widespread use of EM with GPS may have resolved these issues; 
however, not the concerns regarding the variations of random monitoring 
completed between districts. 
In comparison, offenders on EM in Spain must remain at their residence or a 
designated location set by the sentencing judge (Art. 37). For all intent and 
purpose, it is home confinement; however, it is increasingly used in cases of 
domestic abuse to ensure compliance with exclusion orders and/or restraining 
orders and in such cases is considered ‘bilateral’ EM. March 2007, 2,788 offenders 
were supervised on EM in Spain and 3,364 were in Sweden (SPACE II 2010, p. 22). 
Given the difference in their population sizes, this is demonstrative of Sweden’s 
endorsement of this form of supervision and perhaps Spain’s use of EM for only 
minor offences and on average for up to 1 month (Wennerberg and Pinto 2009). 
Although EM was introduced as a sentencing alternative in Spain and Catalonia as 
of 2000 for front door and back door10 schemes, it was only made available in 
certain autonomous communities recently. As aforementioned, this is a profitable 
and growing market. Unsurprisingly, the for-profit sector is one the key 
stakeholders. 
3.3. Privatisation of surveillance: credibility and legitimacy restrictions and 
amplifiers 
Probation has been criticised for having been reduced to risk management (Howard 
League for Penal Reform 2011, p. 12). Intensive supervision, risk assessments and 
EM are examples of progressive extensions to this mindset. Further, at this point in 
time, evidence indicates that sentencers are not using non-custodial sanctions as 
viable alternatives to short-term custodial sentences. They are being used to 
substitute community orders and therefore do not to divert those who would have 
gone to prison otherwise. 
That said, in order for probation and intermediate sentences such as ISPs and 
IAOCs to regain or retain credibility and therefore legitimacy, they must be 
perceived to be effective i.e. reduce reoffending, cost-effective and socially 
acceptable. As far as the judicial agents are concerned they should also strive to be 
proportionate, equal and the penultimate resort with custody as the last resort. 
Although these are three legal principles, the public highly values proportionality 
i.e. just-deserts in sentencing (Doob 2000; Roberts 2003). In accordance with 
Robinson and Ugwudike (2012), a more responsive and flexible use of probation 
will make them more effective and therefore legitimate. Moreover, those who 
complete their sentence are less likely to reoffend (May and Waldwell 2001; 
Hearden and Millie 2001). 
Although dated, various studies completed in Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions found 
restoration to the community to be perceived by members of the public as more 
effective at reducing reoffending than EM (Wright 1989; Angus Reid Group 1997; 
Flanagan 1996). In comparison, two-thirds of victims interviewed in Sweden 
reported viewing EM positively and only a minority viewed it as too lenient (Lappi-
Seppälä 2007, p. 47). It cannot be denied that the private for-profit sector invests 
                                                 
10 Post-custodial schemes such as early release.  
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in research and development, and this is particularly evident in the area of 
electronic monitoring. But, what has this market served? In this respect, EM is a 
good example of entrepreneurial innovation, having created “new institutions that 
dramatically extend the reach of the criminal sanction.... who promote ‘alternatives’ 
that in fact expand the reach of the criminal sanction” (Feeley 2002, p. 334). The 
EM market has grown exponentially and in the case of England and Wales has 
“acquired a momentum” (Nellis 2003, p. 245). Earlier radio-frequency monitoring 
has now been replaced in most jurisdictions discussed by GPS and voice 
recognition. The use of EM kiosks and impersonal substance use testing completed 
at these has further mechanized surveillance and risk management. This led 
Bridges, Bloomfield and Flanagan (2008, p. 2) to conclude that probation and EM 
may be “meeting the contract but missing the point.” 
Electronic monitoring has been demonstrated to be effective at supervising the 
offenders movements; however, it has not been shown to contribute towards 
minimising other factors such as negative associations, substance abuse and 
psychological dispositions (Olatu, Beaupré and Verbrugge 2009, p. 26; National 
Audit Office 2006); however, the structure offered by EM may increase the 
likelihood that offenders will comply with their curfew orders and reduce their 
consumption of drugs and/or alcohol by reducing their opportunities to violate their 
conditions by remaining at home at set times (National Audit Office 2006, p. 24). 
Further, studies have reported high success programme completion rates for 
offenders on EM (Boelens Jonsson and Whitfield 2003; Bonta, Wallace-Capretta and 
Rooney 2000a; Jarred 2000; Finn and Muirhead-Steves 2002); however EM in itself 
was not concluded to be responsible for desistance from offending but rather the 
programmes completed whilst on it (Bonta, Rooney and Wallace-Capretta 2000a). 
Granted, if the offender can remain in the community, maintain ties with family 
members, work and complete treatment programmes, they are more likely to 
reintegrate successfully in their community (Black and Smith 2003; JHSA 2006); 
however, to what degree is it EM and not social ties that are responsible for the 
reintegration of the offender? 
Cullen and Gendreau’s (2000) meta-analysis of existing research on ISPs indicated 
that they actually increased reoffending; however, this may be due to the many 
inflexible requirements and the use of EM, which increase the probability of 
technical violations e.g. detection of drug or alcohol use. Technical violations have 
increased but reoffending hasn’t for those on probation or under intensive 
surveillance (Petersilia and Turner 1990).11 Inflexible enforcement of breaches does 
not reduce reoffending; however, action taken to encourage their compliance and 
completion does (May and Wadwell 2001). This is where members of the 
community as volunteers or probation officers in the case of Sweden can soften the 
automatic turn that probation has taken and EM’s lack of discretion, and perhaps 
increase completions and insertion. In this respect, “enabling supervision to be 
more relationally engaging, more respectful of the offender’s active role in (and 
ownership of) the change process, more helpful in tackling practical problems and 
more fair in its administration, is most likely to yield better outcomes” (McNeill and 
Weaver 2010, p. 12). 
At this point in time, its efficacy is inconclusive. Its ability to prevent future 
offending has not been demonstrated, which has led certain researchers to 
conclude that it should be selectively imposed and not used as a generic 
requirement (Gibbs and King 2003). This also led Florida’s Office of Program Policy 
Analysis and Government Accountability (2005) to recommend that it only be used 
with dangerous habitual and sexual offenders; however, the equipment is now 
widely available and is a condition for certain requirements such as in the case of 
exclusion orders, curfews and early release. Regardless of where audited, EM has 
                                                 
11 In contrast, Aebi and Linde (2010) argue that although property and homicide have decreased, violent 
and drug offences have risen in Western Europe.  
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been shown to be more cost effective than custody, but do all of the offenders 
imposed EM require it or is it also imposed unnecessarily on those judged to be a 
low risk thus widening the penal net by increasing the probability of technical 
violations that had little to do with their offending behaviour in the first place? 
As shown, privatisation of surveillance has occurred to one degree or another in all 
of the jurisdictions presented. At its most extreme is the U.S., which has not only 
privatised all aspects related to EM but also probation in certain states. England and 
Wales are not far behind. Although risk assessments, reports and the enforcement 
of revocations are still carried out by NOMS, which is on the cusp of privatisation 
and is being pressurized to take on the ethos and rules of the for-profit sector, it is 
the private for-profit sector that supplies and installs electronic surveillance 
equipment and monitors compliance. Similarly, the Canadian government has 
established public-private partnerships with various companies to supply EM 
equipment, monitor compliance and report breaches (JHSO 2007). In the case of 
Spain and Catalonia, the equipment is supplied and installed by the private for-
profit sector but is monitored by the prison service; whereas in Sweden, the 
equipment is supplied, installed and monitored by the State (Wennerberg and Pinto 
2009). Finally, in certain jurisdictions such as England and Wales, the same 
companies responsible for supplying and monitoring equipment also run private 
prisons e.g. Serco, G4S, which is a conflict of interest (Public Services International 
Research Unit 2006; Drake 2009). In short, traditional probation has been 
overshadowed by intermediate sanctions such as intensive supervision and 
technologies such as EM. Neither has been demonstrated to encourage desistance. 
Further, based on the few studies completed, intensive supervision is not highly 
valued by the public. If ISP increases reoffending, it is questionable if it is really 
cost-effective. 
It is worth examining whether the supervision provided by EM, which encourages 
programme completion, can be provided by lay persons and a probation service 
that is more reflexive and personal. The involvement of lay persons and non-profit 
organisations to provide local support and to facilitate the insertion of offenders and 
more reflexive probation will not prevent all future offending but is more promising 
than mechanised law enforcement, which has not been shown to be effective or 
cost-effective. It is worth noting the low revoke rates of offenders with lay 
probation officers in Sweden on EM. Nonetheless, Bonta, Rooney and Wallace-
Capretta (1999) and proponents of the risk-need-responsivity model still argue that 
it is appropriate treatment that reduce reoffending. 
4. Drug courts and coercive treatment 
Drug Courts and treatment are argued to be a more holistic approach combining 
punitive and therapeutic approaches. Under Article 3, paragraph 4 of the United 
Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances of 1988, members agreed to provide drug treatment, aftercare, 
rehabilitation or social rehabilitation as an alternative or in addition to indictment or 
punishment. Ten years later and with more experience, signatories of the UN 
Declaration on the Guiding Principles of Drug Demand Reduction (resolution S-
20/3) committed themselves to develop within their respective criminal justice 
system “appropriate capacities for assisting drugs abusers with education, 
treatment and rehabilitation services.” The Declaration also recognised that this 
would require “close cooperation between the criminal justice, health and social 
systems.” Drug courts are in part an outcome of latter conclusion (Mitchell et al. 
2012). Holloway, Bennett and Farrington’s (2008, p. 6) meta-analysis on treatment 
programmes, criminal behaviour and drug use indicated the “two most effective 
programmes measured by the meta-analysis were therapeutic communities and 
supervision.” 
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Drug courts now exist in the U.S., Canada, and England and Wales. The first drug 
court was established in Miami-Dade, Florida in 1989, as a diversion programme for 
drug offenders and was in response to the threatened loss of federal funding due to 
the state’s prison overpopulation (Gottfredson and Exum 2002). Having concluded 
that a sizeable proportion of its prison population were convicted for offences 
attributable to their drug abuse, drug courts were introduced to steer those with 
problematic drug or alcohol use towards treatment in lieu of the traditional 
adversarial system and prisons (Weekes et al. 2007). Unlike other non-custodial 
measures launched in the U.S. which have subsequently been abandoned or fallen 
into disuse, drug courts have proliferated. On 30 June 2010, 2 559 drug courts 
were operating in the U.S. (NADCPa online). These predominantly divert low-level 
and first time offenders. Some states focus on first-time offenders, whereas others 
target repeat offenders. Further, offenders with current or past violent convictions 
cannot have their cases diverted to a drug court that receives financial funding. 
Drug courts in the U.S. function within two systems, the juridical and therapeutic. 
The therapeutic system is highly dependent upon the quantity and quality of local 
service providers. Consequently, their quality varies. 
Canada’s first drug treatment court was established in Toronto in 1998. Six more 
have since been erected (Werb et al. 2007). As in other areas, drug treatment 
courts in Canada involve a multi-agency approach and include a statutory health 
agency alongside the criminal justice system i.e. courts and the police, and 
community based organisations (Caledon Institute of Social Policy 2001). For 
example, the John Howard Society provides housing to participants. 
Since 2004, six Dedicated Drug Courts (DDC) have been created in England and 
Wales. DDCs can impose sentences including one or a combination of the twelve 
requirements available to Magistrate Courts for COs and SSOs. Once again, multiple 
agencies are involved in the process. When assessed, DDCs were found to facilitate 
partnership working between the court, probation, the designated treatment 
agency and the police, and to be viewed positively by offenders and staff (Kerr et 
al. 2011, pp. 6, 16). 
Sweden and Spain have not created a special legal jurisdiction to try persons 
accused for a drug related offences. Mandatory drug and alcohol treatment has 
existed in Sweden since 1982 and contract treatment is but one of the sentencing 
alternatives in their highly structured sentencing system (Boekhout van Solinge 
1997). A special treatment plan is used in combination with a probation order and 
is voluntary i.e. consent or go to prison. Treatment can be offered in a residential 
setting or by an outpatient provider. If a court finds compulsory residential 
treatment to be a viable alternative, it can request that the social welfare board 
assess and rule on the case. They are responsible for overseeing and implementing 
the court’s decision. Nevertheless, treatment is delivered by public institutions as 
well as private and non-governmental organisations (European Centre for Drugs 
and Drug Addiction 2011). Sweden’s drug policy is first and foremost directed at 
preventing initiation (Holloway, Bennett and Farrington 2008). Unsurprisingly, 24% 
of persons sentenced to prison were condemned for drugs or goods trafficking in 
2009 (Swedish Prison and Probation Service/Kriminalvården 2010, p. 16). 
Custodial sentences can also be suspended in Spain if the court concludes that the 
offending is drug related and the corresponding custodial sentence is less than 5 
years (Art. 87 Spanish Criminal Code). The offender’s dependency must be 
confirmed by a medical examiner who can be a private practitioner. Further, a 
public or duly accredited private centre must certify that the offender has either 
completed the treatment programme or is receiving treatment. Although drug 
treatment is coordinated at a national level under the Government’s Delegation for 
the National Plan on Drugs within the Ministry of Health and Consumers Affairs, 
Autonomous Communities also have their own drug treatment strategies overseen 
by a regional drug treatment coordinator. For example, six associations, non-
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governmental associations and social organisations received grants from the State 
in 2009 to supervise and administer non-custodial sentences involving drug 
treatment (BOE 16 November 2009); however, courts take recourse to many more 
public and regionally financed private service providers. In 2005, tribunals in the 
BAC diverted offenders to at least 46 different treatment programmes. This figure 
includes private and public residential centres in and outside of the BAC e.g. 
Etorkintza, Proyecto Hombre, Jotad, as well as statutory healthcare services 
(Observatorio Vasco de Drogodependencias 2009). In 2008, 1 908 offenders 
received a non-custodial sentence in the BAC. Of these, 1 318 were for drug related 
offences and 1 261 received a suspended sentence (SAER Memoria 2008). 
4.1. Therapeutic reflexive communitarian alternatives 
In order for the courts to “provide a net economic benefit to society” and to 
recuperate costs stemming from the transition to and the running of drug courts as 
well as those related to reduced drug use, the criminal justice sector and the public 
i.e. health care, victimisation etc., 8 to 14% of offenders would have to remain 
abstinent for at least 5 years (Matrix Knowledge Group 2006, p. vii). Drug courts 
are now used in many countries in Europe, North and South America etc. On the 
whole, they have been found to produce significant economic, social and individual 
benefits (Walker 2001). Turner et al.’s (2002) controlled study on a drug court in 
Maricopa, Arizona statistically significantly demonstrated a drop in recidivism for 
participants. In contrast, studies completed in the U.S. and Canada are less 
optimistic (US General Accountability Office 2005; Werb et al. 2007). 
At this point in time, little conclusive evidence exists demonstrating that coercive 
drug treatment and drug courts reduce long-term reoffending (Mugford and Weekes 
2006; Mitchell et al. 2012). The evidence indicates that offenders condemned of 
drug related offending who attend court mandated drug treatment commit fewer 
offences, in particular acquisitive crimes whilst in treatment (Gottfredson, Najaka 
and Kearley 2003, pp. 188-89); however, the evidence is less conclusive for 
periods after treatment completion. Nor is it clear what exactly has led to the 
desistance or reduction i.e. coercion, counselling, substitute prescriptions etc. 
(Miller 2009); however, this may be due to relapses into drug use and that drug 
use for some offenders is not the primary cause of crime. 
“A realistic starting point... is that relapses happen” (Lappi-Seppälä 2007, p. 39). 
Regular drug testing was introduced in the 1980s for those released on bail or 
probation. As in the case of intensive supervision and EM, recalls for technical 
violations such as drug use have grown exponentially.12 When interviewed, 
offenders receiving mandated treatment reported contrasting perceptions of drug 
testing as well as drug services and probation workers aims (McSweeney, Stevens 
and Turnbull 2008). Some found drug testing motivational whereas others 
questioned if it accurately assessed progress made. We have now come to accept 
that offending behaviour is not a static condition but dynamic and yet through the 
introduction of elements such as EM and systematic testing, probation has become 
more automatic (Feeley 2002). The lack of responsiveness and unrealistic 
expectations increase the likelihood of failure, which undermines the credibility of 
drug treatment as a viable non-custodial sanction. 
The European Union and the European Monitoring Centre on Drugs and Drug 
Addiction (European Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction 2012) recently created 
the ‘Best practice portal’ in response to the EU drug action plan (2009-2012) as 
well as to improve the quality and effectiveness of related activities, which includes 
treatment. Similarly, the European Association for the Treatment of Addiction has 
produced a programme accreditation scheme. The Swedish Prison and Probation 
                                                 
12 Between June 1995 and January 2009, imprisonment for breach of non-custodial sentences increased 
by 470% (Ministry of Justice, 2009). 
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Service (Kriminalvården) introduced a similar programme review as well as an 
accreditation process. England and Wales use two quality standards that are also 
used when commissioning: the Quality in Alcohol and Drug Standards (QuADS) and 
the drugs and alcohol national occupational standards (DANOS). The latter was 
introduced to ensure treatment providers were competent and to introduce a 
qualification framework for national competency benchmarks (National Treatment 
Agency 2003). Although there has been an effort to standardise interventions, 
when reviewed, researchers continue to report a lack of uniformity. 
That said, the successful functioning of mandated drug interventions depends on 
the criminal justice’s ability to cooperate with external treatment providers. 
Whether imposed by a drug court or not, a holistic approach increases the 
likelihood of engagement with treatment and improves the chances of successful 
completion of treatment, which increases the likelihood of lesser drug use and 
related offending (Matrix Knowledge Group 2006; United Nations 1999, p. 13). 
Although dated, Lightfoot et al. (1982) found substance abusers receiving case 
management to have had better community outcomes than a control and in 
particular, those who lacked social support and had unsuccessfully attended 
treatment in the past. In this case, the private sector – predominantly non-profit 
organisations (Meek, Gojkovic and Mills 2010), provides not only treatment but also 
support, which given probation officers growing caseload may be scarce. 
Unfortunately, due to sometimes conflicting interpretations and remits, information 
sharing between the agents involved can be difficult. For instance, treatment 
providers may value and be more attuned to an offender’s motivation, and have a 
more reflexive response. The probation officer has been stripped of this discretion 
due to strict and inflexible requirements (Mair and Mills 2009, p. 26). 
In line with the conclusions drawn by Doob and Marinos (1999) in their study on 
conditional sentences in Canada and Hough and Roberts’ (1999) in their study on 
public opinion on sentencers in England, an informed public is key to gaining public 
support and also serves to counter inaccurate media portrayals. The same 
organisations that offer treatment to offenders are also the best equipped to train 
and inform probation services and the public. With the exception of Sweden, the 
contribution of the voluntary sector is limited in this area; however, volunteers can 
buttress treatment services provided by specialised non-profit organisations and 
statutory health agencies. They can facilitate the insertion of participants and have 
the potential to provide social capital for a group of offenders who may have 
become socially marginalised and have depleted social networks due to their 
chaotic lifestyles (Bottoms 2003; Roe et al. 2010, p. 1976). 
Undoubtedly, drug use is heavily morally burdened. There are those who advocate 
prohibitionism and abstinence; whereas others at the other polar extreme support 
the decriminalisation of all narcotics. Educating the public may not change their 
moral stance; however it may humanise the drug dependent. Members of the public 
may come to accept that prison has been repeatedly demonstrated not to increase 
the likelihood of recovery and that it is in their interest that drug misuse be 
effectively dealt with. Further, most drug dependents are socially marginalised. 
Either through direct contact or through the use of user narratives the public’s 
attitudes and stereotypes may be minimised and may become more inclusive 
(McNeill and Weaver 2010). In this respect, the involvement of volunteers and non-
adversarial non-profit organisations to assist drug offenders whether through 
treatment and/or support is imperative. 
In 1999, the United Nations promoted the use of performance indicators to 
evaluate whether programmes worked or not, and if so, for who. They 
recommended that the following indicators be included: reduced drug abuse on 
behalf of the offender and, the improved general heath and quality of life of the 
offender such as employment and stable accommodations. With the exception of 
employment and accommodations, these are qualitative variables that require a 
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margin of discretion and flexibility. It is questionable whether the key performance 
indicators used by the for-profit sector can validly assess qualitative progress; 
however, as in the case of support and training, the non-profit sector is the best 
equipped on a local level to help the offender develop what Braithwaite (2002) 
referred to as a micro-community i.e. ‘social capital’, which can help improve their 
quality of life and general health.  
Offenders value specialist drug workers knowledge and understanding (Mair and 
Mills 2009). They are perceived as more approachable, less adversarial and 
trustworthy due to their independence from the criminal justice system (Meek, 
Gojkovic and Mills 2010). Many of these traits are shared by restorative justice 
schemes. The following section will discuss some of the present strengths and 
weaknesses of restorative justice practices, which are grounded on community 
involvement. 
5. Restitution and restoration 
This is a quickly evolving area. Fines are not a new sanction, unpaid work as a form 
of community compensation has now been in place for over forty years and penal 
mediation has been used since the 80s. The latter has evolved considerably, which 
is mainly due to the emergence of the victim in criminal proceedings. This section 
presents the various forms of restitution presently being used and concludes with a 
brief comment on the new avenues that have opened up over the last fifteen years. 
Fines and unpaid work are presented together given that the emergence of unpaid 
work as a sentence was in response to the shortcomings of fines. Non-profit 
agencies were and continue to be the protagonists of changes occurring in this 
area. 
5.1. Restitution: fines and unpaid work 
Once again, fines are a non-custodial sentence that for all intent and purpose has 
gone into disuse in the U.S. (Tonry 1997). Under federal sentencing guidelines they 
cannot be used as a sole penalty and can only be used as a condition of probation. 
Nevertheless, many states’ own sentencing guideline do. Following the successful 
pilot of day-fines in the Staten Islands, New York by the Vera Institute of Justice, 
similar pilots were rolled out in other states; however, Arizona is the only state 
presently using them (Vera Institute of Justice 1996; Tonry 1997). 
Fines and/or restitution can be levied in Canada. In addition, there exists a victim 
fine surcharge, which is a charge of up to 15% in addition to the fine.13 When used 
as a sentence and unpaid, the offender can be immediately re-arrested14; however, 
if used as part of a probation order the offender can enter the fine option 
programme i.e. unpaid work. 
In contrast to the U.S., fines were the most common order used in England and 
Wales in 2009 having increased by 6% over the previous year. 94% were handed 
down for summary offences and nearly all were handed down by a Magistrate court. 
Drug offences were the most common indictable offence for which fines were used. 
Although far less common then treatment and exclusion orders for summary 
offences, the use of fines for indictable offences has steadily increased since 2005. 
The use of the SSO as of 2005 is argued to be largely responsible for this increase 
(Ministry of Justice 2010). 
Unpaid work is one of the oldest community sentencing options and dates back to 
the 1960s in Alameda County, California. It allowed for low-income traffic offenders 
                                                 
13 A similar fine exists in Sweden however it is a fee paid by employed offenders on EM (§ 5 Lag (1994, 
p. 451) om intensivövervakningmed elektronisk kontroll [Law on intensive supervision by means of 
electronic monitoring]); Von Hofer 2001, p.309). 
14 Only if the judge includes a default order when sentencing.  
Alison Hogg  The Privatisation of Non-Custodial Measures… 
 
who were unable to pay their fine to work it off (Tonry and Lynch 1995). The 
California project was promoted as a sentence option that was inexpensive to 
administer, profitable and met with wide-spread support. Similarly, in the mid-
1960s, Canada’s Corrections Branch concluded that a high proportion of males 
admitted to provincial correctional centres were there due to their inability to pay 
their fines. Further, in certain provinces it had become apparent that this group 
consisted predominantly of First Nations (Heath 1979). In an effort to eliminate 
‘prison for debt’, the Fine Option Programme was created. Under this programme 
an individual can work their fine off through unpaid work that is performed at a 
non-profit, charitable community-based organisation. Unpaid work is now one of 
the most commonly used requirements for both COs and SSOs in England and 
Wales (Mair and Mills 2009, p. 11). It was first introduced in England at the 
beginning of the 1970s and is the product of the Wooton Report on cannabis and 
LSD use. In contrast, unpaid work is now “the most underused intermediate 
sanction in the United States” (Tonry 1997, p. 11). 
As in the case of Canada, most unpaid work in Sweden is undertaken for a non-
profit organisation. Probation in combination with an unpaid work order was made 
available experimentally in 1993 and became a permanent feature of the Swedish 
system as of 1999. In 1999, changes were introduced making unpaid work more 
retributive. These changes amended the calculating rules and raised the minimum 
length of the day. In 2005, unpaid work and conditional sentences were the second 
most common combination for a non-custodial sanction (35%) (Lappi-Seppälä 
2007, p. 27). In 2007, men condemned for a violent crime were the most common 
recipient of a community work order (1 722); whereas, women convicted of a drunk 
driving offence were (147) (Swedish Prison and Probation Service /Kriminalvården 
2009). In 2009, 1 466 offenders were sentenced to a community work order. In 
addition, 4 259 were on conditional release with a requirement to complete unpaid 
work, which are supervised by either a supervising probation officer in the capacity 
of a layman or by a non-custodial care officer. The former is a volunteer whose 
remit is to support, steer and motivate the offender not to reoffend or relapse into 
drug use (Ibid., 2010). 
Similarly, unpaid work is a common sanction for persons condemned of a motoring 
offence and ‘non-serious’ forms of family violence in Spain. Both were previously 
administrative offences (McIvor et al. 2010). Up until the enactment of Royal 
Decree 1849/2009 of 4 December, problems related to its delayed implementation 
in certain autonomous communities, long waiting lists and the potential for a 
sizeable number of orders to expire without having been executed attracted 
criticism from Spanish judges thus minimising the credibility of this requirement. 
Under this decision, municipalities are now responsible for providing and overseeing 
unpaid work undertaken by their residents. Municipalities must now present 
monthly reports to their local Prison Administration stating the number of projects 
available as well as the outcome of completed projects. 
Given the original motive for incorporating fines in the criminal justice system, it 
should come as no surprise that the solvency of the offender is now taken into 
consideration when fines are set in all of the countries discussed. In the case of 
Sweden, the daily rate should reflect roughly half of the offender’s daily earnings. A 
handbook is used by officials, police, prosecutor and courts to calculate the exact 
rate (Sveri 1998). Fines and unpaid work can be imposed as part of sentence and 
can be an agreed outcome of mediation. If a mediated outcome of restorative 
justice, both requirements are more likely to be respected. 
5.2. Restoration: mediation and healing circles 
Victim offender mediation (VOM) was first formally used in a criminal court setting 
in 1974 in Ontario, Canada (Umbreit, Coates and Vos 2004). VOM is now used at all 
stages of the judicial process i.e. prior to a court referral or after, prior to 
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adjudication or conviction but before sentencing, and after sentencing. Restitution 
can include direct compensation to the victim, unpaid work and unusual payback 
schemes. 
The restorative justice models presently used in North America and Europe are 
similar but also quite distinct. Twenty-nine states in the U.S. now use VOM. Non-
profit community based agencies are responsible for close to half of all VOM 
programmes. Probation, correctional facilities, prosecuting attorney offices, victim 
service and police services are responsible for the remainder (Tonry 2005). In the 
U.S., the majority of the offences referred to VOM are misdemeanours such as 
vandalism, theft, minor assaults and burglaries. In Canada, VOM is also currently 
being used in cases involving violent crimes and to the shock of many in cases of 
sex abuse. Further, Canada has a police based diversion programme, Community 
Justice Forums, which is based on the Family Group Conferencing used in New 
Zealand and Australia. These are products of the Restorative Justice philosophy. It 
is no coincidence that all three countries have important aboriginal communities, 
which make them more conducive to restorative practices (Tonry 2005). If 
appropriate, a trained facilitator (police officer or community volunteer) summon 
primary, secondary and tertiary victims –including the perpetrator (Umbreit, Coates 
and Vos 2004). The offence, the perpetrator and a course of action are discussed. 
In most cases, it involves restitution to the victim and the community. If 
successfully completed, charges are not filed. As in the case of drug courts, it is a 
more holistic approach that aims to repair and reduce harms, and should not be an 
adversarial process. Similar practices are now being used in the U.S. but they do 
not have the same scope as those used in New Zealand, Australia and Canada. 
VOM is the form most commonly used in Europe. The ideal outcome is an 
acknowledgement of the harm caused and an agreed restoration. In turn, the case 
is not adjudicated. It was first used with young offenders and is now being used 
increasingly in cases of domestic violence. Few studies have been completed 
assessing the efficacy of restorative justice in Sweden and Spain. Miers et al. 
(2001, pp. 56-59) assessed the Catalonian youth model and concluded that 
although it had had positive outcomes, there was a need to carry out additional 
studies to evaluate the long-term effects. More recently, Varona (2009) published a 
study assessing penal mediation in the BAC. Victims and offenders were found to 
have been satisfied with the process. The BAC has since officially recognised trained 
private mediators thus directly incorporating the work of trained private workers in 
the criminal justice process. 
The Healing Circle, a First Nation version of restorative justice, is based on group 
deliberation, decision-making, conflict resolution and community healing. It is being 
used in cases that for some are unconceivable. The Community Holistic Circle 
Healing (CHCH) was established in 1998 in Manitoba, Canada to deal with a serious 
sex offender in the Hollow Water First Nation Community. In 2001, it was evaluated 
and concluded to have numerous collateral positive effects (Couture et al. 2001). 
Similar projects have since emerged in Ontario under the Mennonite Central 
Committee’s Circles of Support and Accountability and work with high-risk sex 
offenders when they are released back into the community (Wilson and Prinzo 
2001). It is therefore being used as a front and back-door strategy. 
5.3. Democratic improvements to communitarian justice 
As presented, restitution can include direct compensation to the victim, community 
service and unusual paybacks agreed upon by the victim and offender. Restitution 
may be a sentence on its own or be the outcome of restorative dialogue. Non-profit 
community agencies were and continue to be the protagonists of these measures; 
however, the private for-profit sector is now breaking into the market of unpaid 
work and fines, requirements that have traditionally fallen within the remit of 
probation. 
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Fines are seen not to be sufficiently punitive or effective due to the high rates of 
non-compliance. The English and Welsh public perceive EM as a more punitive 
measure than fines - in particular if the offender can afford the fine. If the offender 
cannot pay their fine, respondents felt that the family of the offender should suffer 
the financial consequences (National Audit Office 2006).15 Perhaps in response, Her 
Majesty’s Court Service in England and Wales launched “Operation Payback” in 
November 2004. An advertising campaign was held notifying persons with 
outstanding fines that they may have the wheels of their cars clamped, the sum 
deducted from job seekers allowance and income support etc. The scheme aimed to 
identify offenders with outstanding fines, have them paid and if necessary to issue 
warrants ordering defaulters back to court (BBC 2004a). It may also have served to 
play into the public’s perception that fines weren’t sufficiently painful. Only a month 
earlier, the government signed an agreement with the credit reference agency 
Equifax to access their computer database (BBC 2004b). Magistrate court 
committees were able to access and use information such as current address, credit 
card and loan applications in order to track outstanding fraud defaulters. If unable 
to pay the fine, defaulters can be sent to prison or pay it off through the completion 
of unpaid work. In order to salvage political credibility, private for-profit companies 
have been brought on board to assist the government. 
Zimring (1974) found unpaid work in the U.S. to have had little if no effect on re-
offending. A decade later, Pease’s (1985) review of two British studies conducted in 
the 1970s was equally unpromising. Re-offending rates for unpaid work were 
neither higher nor lower than rates for offenders sent to prison. More recently, 
Tonry and Lynch (1995) came to a similar conclusion in their review of studies in 
the U.S. and the Netherlands. The only exception is the study completed by Killias 
in 2001 on Switzerland. In contrast, Spain reported a comparatively lower 
recidivism rate for completers than its contemporaries e.g. Belgium, Scotland and 
Sweden (McIvor et al. 2010). The researchers concluded that this may have been 
due to the contrasting profiles of offenders receiving unpaid work orders in Spain. A 
sizeable proportion of qualifying offenders were employed and educated beyond 
school level at the time of sentencing, which was not the case for other countries 
studied. This led them to conclude that the low recidivism may indicate that their 
offences did not have a strong association with deprivation or poverty, which 
contrasts considerably with the stated motives for which unpaid work was first 
introduced in North America. 
Although not related to reductions of reoffending but equally relevant for the sake 
of public credibility, an audit on unpaid work commissioned by the Probation 
Service in 2008 found that only 35% of the projects were visible to the public. 
Shortly after, the Ministry of Justice announced that unpaid work was to be 
transformed into the Community Payback Scheme. January 2009, a webpage was 
created that aimed to involve communities. Offenders must now wear an orange 
vest that clearly states that they are carrying out community payback services thus 
combining restitution with public shaming and stigmatisation. At present, probation 
services are responsible for supervising the completion of this requirement; 
however, as aforementioned this is an area that the Ministry of Justice has 
announced will now be open to the private sector. On 21 January 2011, the 
government ran a competition for the delivery of the community payback scheme, 
which includes its provision, and when necessary the transport of individuals to and 
from the sites. This public service is therefore now open to the private and 
voluntary sectors. Serco, Sodexco and Mities are the preferred bidders with no 
voluntary groups making the shortlist (Ministry of Justice 2011b). Probation Trusts 
will compete with the aforementioned private corporations to secure contracts. 
Unison, the main union for probation officers, claims unpaid work is one of the 
                                                 
15 In contrast, Wright (1989) found 85% of respondents to consider restitution to be more effective at 
reducing reoffending than EM; whereas, respondents interviewed two years earlier by Cole et al. (1987) 
did not view fines as an equitable alternative to probation and incarceration. 
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principal tasks presently overseen by Probation Trusts and voiced its concern that 
some Trusts may no longer be viable should they lose this contract. 
Unpaid work is promoted as a means of not only ‘paying back the community’ i.e. 
restitution but also of developing skills and re-establishing links with the community 
despite them becoming more punitive and exclusionary. Further, the private for-
profit sector is playing an increasingly important role in their delivery. On the other 
hand, the involvement of the victim, community and offender is restorative justice 
schemes is promising but research assessing its efficacy i.e. reducing reoffending is 
sparse. 
5.4. Restoration and the community 
In accordance with (Shapland et al. 2006, p. 506), restorative justice is “an 
umbrella concept, sheltering beneath its spokes a variety of practices, including 
mediation, conferencing, sentencing circles and community panels.” Most studies 
assessing the effectiveness of restorative justice have been completed on its use in 
Anglo-Saxon countries. Consequently, conclusions drawn cannot be directly 
exported to other countries; however, they may be indicative of certain common 
weaknesses and strengths. On the whole, restorative justice whether mediation, 
conferencing or circles have been found to reduce reoffending, reduce post-
traumatic stress in victims and when used as diversion to be cheaper (Latimer, 
Downe and Muise 2005; Strang and Sherman 2007). Although promising, selection 
bias for programmes must also be taken into account. Only individuals likely to 
cooperate are selected for programmes; however, that is the case with all non-
custodial measures. Regardless of the form used, restorative justice can be used to 
ensure greater compliance with restitution orders, which may include attendance to 
programmes (Latimer, Downe and Muise 2005). As mentioned in the section on EM, 
it isn’t surveillance per se that has been demonstrated to reduce reoffending but 
the programmes that the offender attends whilst being monitored. 
As far as victim satisfaction is concerned, face-to-face contact between the offender 
and victim is considered one of its strengths. Regardless of the format used, the 
victim’s involvement in the process and not solely for utilitarian purposes such as 
obtaining a conviction from their testimonial was found to increase satisfaction. 
Victims and ideally the community should be involved throughout the process. 
Although, the criminal justice system is frequently viewed as the obstacle, we fail to 
account for the ‘normative assumptions’ about justice held by the community, 
which can be equally cumbersome to the process (Shapland et al. 2006). Further, 
when used in a criminal justice setting, roles are pre-determined. The offender 
must accept responsibility i.e. guilt before mediation can begin and the community 
is rarely involved during VOM. Zehr (1990) described VOM as dyadic and 
recognised that it failed to empower the community. In order for it to be 
democratic, the community must also be involved. All of these weaken the benefits 
that can be drawn from mediation such as insertion. It isn’t solely the victim that 
must ‘receive’ the offender but the community as well (Maruna 2006). 
Studies examining victim satisfaction with criminal justice case proceedings indicate 
that it is their inclusion and participation in the process, which increases satisfaction 
(Umbreit 1998; Latimer, Downe and Muise 2005). Further, if involved in the 
process they are more likely to perceive the sentence as fair. Finally, victims are 
more likely to receive an apology than in the case of adversarial hearing (Strang 
and Sherman 2003, p. 28), which some argued facilitates their ‘healing’ and 
diminishes their desire for revenge or retribution. 
Its ability to divert offenders from custody is inconclusive. Studies carried out in 
England and Scotland in the early nineties concluded that VOM programmes were 
responsible for minimal net-widening (Dignan, 1990; Warner 1992); whereas 
studies carried out in the U.S. during the same period concluded that VOM did 
indeed divert offenders. Those that received a custodial sentence received a shorter 
 
Oñati Socio-Legal Series, v. 2, n. 4 (2012) 
ISSN: 2079-5971 164 
Alison Hogg  The Privatisation of Non-Custodial Measures… 
 
sentence than those who had not partaken in mediation (Clark, Valente, and Mace 
1992). 
As in the case of all the measures presented, the success of restorative justice lies 
is “Getting the word out about such viable options.” Getting the word out about 
what restorative justice is, who can and should be involved, what can be expected 
and accepting that cultural normative beliefs may be entrenched but are not static. 
As shown, different forms are being used in by the traditionally adversarial system, 
religious communities and various distinct cultures. One of the strengths of 
restorative justice is that it is flexible and can adjust and be reflexive to the needs 
of all participants, and is forward thinking. For example, the Social Reconstruction 
Project Prakak is an international volunteer camp supported by a UK NGO, Quaker 
Peace and Social Witness and the United Nations. Similarly, ex-prisoners are now 
running various community-based restorative justice projects in Northern Ireland 
and have been accredited with facilitating the adoption of nonviolent approaches to 
conflict and resolution (Eriksson 2009; McEvoy 2009). 
6. Conclusion 
In a punitive context dominated by risk aversion, we often overlook aims of non-
custodial measures such as rehabilitation and insertion, which go beyond utilitarian 
aims to reduce prison overpopulation and punish. Community sanctions have 
become more onerous and punitive in effort to appease public concerns or rather 
community sentences’ lack of legitimacy. Further, retribution has come to override 
the legal principles of proportionality and custody as a last resort therefore 
annulling any attempts to either contain or decrease prison populations. There is 
now ample evidence demonstrating that they are not being used to divert 
individuals from prison. To the contrary, they are being used to manage risk and 
against individuals who in past would not have been brought into the penal web. In 
this regard, certain non-custodial measures such as EM are the modern example 
transportation. That is, contrary to popular belief they are being used to sanction 
individuals who should be punished less rather than more (Feeley 2002). This is all 
the more preoccupying when we consider that many of the companies at the 
forefront of the electronic monitoring market are also those at the head of private 
prisons. 
The main objective set at the beginning of this paper was to consider whether and 
if so how, the private sector can contribute to rendering non-custodial sanctions 
more legitimate and therefore credible alternatives to custody. There are now 
numerous studies confirming the lack of confidence of agents involved in the 
judicial process in non-custodial sentences as well as the public. Many examples 
were provided; however, there remains much room for improvement. The 
involvement of the private for-profit sector is not new and seems inevitable in 
certain areas; however, it can and should be pruned in other areas. There is a 
relative consensus that prison population growth must be contained and that 
community sentences are a means of achieving it; however, there lacks “an 
ideological commitment to reducing the use of custody” (Mills 2011, p. 22). It must 
therefore involve a commitment to reducing prison populations, to using non-
custodial sanctions whenever possible and custody as a last resort. This will also 
involve reforming criminal legislation to avoid net-widening, changing sentencing 
practices and the public’s normative beliefs regarding justice, and allow the 
community i.e. victim, offender and public to re-appropriate the process (United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2007). In accordance with Bridges (2007 cited in 
Mills 2011, p. 21) “What we have to think about is recalibrating our expectations 
about what sentencing is supposed to achieve.” 
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